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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioner's motion is not properly before the Supreme Court
on Certiorari.

There is no final agency order in this case.

Petitioner's motion is pre-mature because it appeals from an
interlocutory order. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "parties
must exhaust administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking
judicial review. . . . "

Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning, 659

P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983).
In Sloan v. Bd. of Rev, of Industrial Comm'n., 781 P.2d 463,
464 (Utah App. 1989), the Court held that a remand order in an
administrative hearing was not a final appealable order. Likewise,
Mr. Barney's interlocutory order on the double jeopardy issue is
not a final order.

The Court stated that "an order of the Agency

is not final so long as it reserves something to the agency for
further decision."

Id.

In Eliason v. Buhler, et at., (order of the Utah Court of
Appeals, case no. 900518-CA, December 5, 1990), the Court of
Appeals noted that the ALJ's "final order" is "his order 'at the
close of [the instant] adjudicative proceeding.'"
U.C.A. § 13-1-12(1) (a)

(Supp. 1990).

JEci., citing

When the Utah Court of

Appeals addressed the jurisdictional issue in its decision, it
stated, "The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over
proceedings of state agencies."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a)
1

(Supp. 1991).

This statute does not authorize the* court to review

the orders of every administrative agency, but allows judicial
review

of

agency

decisions

authorizes a right of review."

"when

the

legislature

expressly

DeBrv v. Salt Lake County Bd. of

Appeals, 764 P.2d 627, 628 (Utah App. 1988).
Proceedings

in

the

Division

Administrative Procedures Act.

are

governed

by

the

Utah

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l)

(1989) grants this court jurisdiction to review final agency
actions resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. See Barney
v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, (Utah Court
of Appeals case no. 910755-CA March 26, 1992).
Furthermore, Petitioner improperly seeks a review of the
administrative decision rather than seeking a review of the Court
of Appeals decision. In a recent case of Butterfield v. Okubo, No.
900272, slip opinion at 6 n.2 (Ut. Sup. Ct., April 17, 1992), the
Supreme Court stated that to address other than the Court of
Appeals decision is an improper use of the Certiorari procedure.
The Utah Supreme Court stated:
Many lawyers, after a writ of certiorari has been
granted, ignore the court of appeals' decision to
which the writ applies and brief the correctness or
incorrectness of the trial court ruling as though
we were considering that ruling instead of the
court of appeals'.
In fact, on occasion, the
briefs filed with this court appear to be only
copies of those originally filed with the court of
appeals. Given the relatively new existence of the
court of appeals and certiorari procedure in Utah,
2

such an approach may be understandable, though
wrong. But five years have passed since the court
of appeals was created. We take this opportunity
to remind the bar that when exercising our
certiorari jurisdiction granted by section 78-22(3) (a), we review a decision of the court of
appeals, not of the trial court. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a). Therefore, the briefs of the
parties should address the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. To
restate the matter: We do not grant certiorari to
review de novo the trial court's decision. See
Utah R. App. P. 46.
Accordingly, Petitioner's
motion before the Utah Supreme Court improperly
seeks a writ of certiorari to review the
administrative ruling.
Subject to clearly defined exceptions, the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow appeal
only from the final judgment that concludes that action. See Pate
v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984); Backstrom
Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Utah App.
1988).

The exceptions to the general rule are an interlocutory

appeal under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 5 or an appeal of an
order properly certified by the trial court as a final order for
purposes of appeal under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
the

above

analysis,

the

Utah

Supreme

jurisdiction over this matter.

3

Court

does

Based on
not

have

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Interpretation

of

the

following

statutes

and

rules

is

determinative of this appeal: Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-2(6) (1953);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a); Utah Code Ann. Title 58; 2 Am.Jur.
2d, 21 392; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11; 5 C. Wright A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1333 at 177 (1987 Supp);
Rules

Utah

Court of Appeals

40(a); Utah Rules

of Appellate

Procedure 33, 40; Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 46. (Appendix
A)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner is licensed by the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing to administer a Health Care Facility.

The

Division is empowered to suspend, revoke or place on probation the
license of any licensee who is or has been guilty of unprofessional
conduct, as defined by statute or rule. (See § 58-1-2(6) Utah Code
Ann.

(1953))

On May 2, 1991, the Division filed its initial

petition alleging that the petitioner engaged in unprofessional
conduct including physically abusing four patients, administering
contaminated medicines, and administering medication without a
physician's order. On July 22, 1991, the Division filed an amended
petition alleging similar conduct.
On May 14, 1990, Petitioner was found by the Second Circuit
4

Court to be not guilty of assault of one of the four patients. On
April 25, 1991, charges of "Abuse of Mentally 111 Persons" were
dismissed. Petitioner moved to dismiss the Division's petitions on
grounds that the proceeding constituted double jeopardy under the
federal and state constitutions, and on a claim that the Division
did

not

have

subject

matter

Administrative Procedures Act.

jurisdiction

under

the

Utah

Administrative Law Judge Steve

Eklund denied the initial motion to dismiss on August 2, 1991, and
denied the motion to dismiss the amended petition on October 30,
1991.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Agency Review, requesting
a review of the denial of the motion to dismiss.

On December 18,

1991, the agency issued an order denying Petitioner's request for
agency review of the denial of the motion to dismiss.

Petitioner

then appealed the Motion to Dismiss with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed
jurisdiction

in

a

published

opinion

the matter
filed

for lack of

March

26, 1992.

Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals
for a Stay of Remittitur to file an appeal with the Utah Supreme
Court. His motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
now files this Petition for Certiorari dated April 24, 1992,
requesting that the Supreme Court review the agency action on the
merits rather than to properly review the denial of the Request for
5

Stay of Remittitur.
Respondent contends Petitioner's Motion is without merit and
frivolous and should be dismissed.

Respondent further requests

sanctions against Petitioner and his attorney and reasonable
attorney fees be awarded to Respondent.

POINT I
THIS APPEAL IS BROUGHT IN VIOLATION OF RULES 33 AND 40 #
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
In bringing this appeal, the Petitioner and Attorney Stratford
have violated Rules 33 and 40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
which state that no appeal shall be frivolous or brought for the
purpose of delay.

Several cases discuss issues of sanctions and

attorney's fees raised by these rules.
In Taylor v. Estates of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah 1989) the
Court stated concerning Rule 40:
This rulef which mirrors Fed.R.Civ.P. 11,
'requires some inquiry into both the facts and
the law before the paper is filed; the level
of inquiry is tested against a standard of
reasonableness under the circumstances." 5 C.
Wright A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1333 at 177 (1987 Supp. ) This
objective approach allows sanctions to be
imposed in a greater range of circumstances
than did the pre-amendment, subjective 'bad
faith' approach. See Golden Eagle Distrib.
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 153638 (9th Cir. 1986); Davis v. Veslan Enters.,
765 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1985). Cf. Cadv
v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Utah 1983)

6

(pre-amendment case employing subjective 'bad
faith' analysis). . . However, in a number of
cases this court has imposed sanctions
pursuant to our rules, including R. Utah
Ct.App. 40(a) which imposes a similar duty on
litigants and their counsel. Brigham City v.
Mantua Torn, 754 P.2d 1230, 1236-37 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988); Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah
Ct.App.
1988);
Backstrom
Family
Ltd.
Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah
Ct.App. 1988); Barber v. The Emporium
Partnership, 750 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah Ct.App.
1988); 0'Brian v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310
(Utah Ct. App. 1987. These cases establish
that Rule 40(a) imposes a duty to investigate
the factual and legal basis of an appeal or
appellate document before filing.
See
Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership, 751 P.2d at
1160; 0'Brian, 744 P.2d at 310. Subjective
intentions are essentially irrelevant; the
determination of whether the rule has been
violated is made on an objective basis. Id.
Except to the extent that a somewhat less
forgiving approach should perhaps be employed
at the appellate level, we find that this
analysis is equally applicable to the
similarly worded Rule 11.
A frivolous appeal has been defined as one
without reasonable legal or factual basis as
defined in Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals
40(a). Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v.
Hall, 751 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah Ct.App. 1988);
0' Brian v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah
Ct.App. 1987).
Sanctions for bringing a
frivolous appeal 'should only be applied in
egregious cases, lest there be an improper
chilling of the right to appeal erroneous
lower court decisions.' Porco v. Porco, 752
P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). The Porco
court categorized egregious cases as those
obviously without merit, with no reasonable
likelihood of prevailing, and which result in
delay in implementing a judgment. Jd.; see
also Auburn Harps we 11 Ass'n v. Dan, 438 A.2d
7

234, 239 (Me. 1981) (per curiam).
added)

(emphasis

The Backstrom case, cited above, is a case involving a
debtor/creditor relationship, this Court stated that "[a]n appeal
must be well grounded in fact or law and must not be brought for
the purposes of delay . . . .

The decision to appeal should only

be reached after careful consideration by counsel and client." Id.
The case at hand is not "well grounded in fact or in law."
Petitioner and Attorney Stratford are doing little more than rearguing their case on appeal in the hopes that this Court will make
different

findings of

fact.

The administrative

Petitioner's claims were without merit.

court found

The Court of Appeals

subsequently denied the Appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The

record in support of the appeal before this court is flimsy.

The

only purpose of this appeal is to delay the right of the public to
have a hearing on the Carl Barney health care licensing issue in
violation of Rules 33 and 40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 33 defines a frivolous motion as follows:
For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous
appeal, motion, brief or other paper is one
that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or revise existing
law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper
interposed for the purpose of delay is one
interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of
litigation, or gain time that will benefit
only the party filing the appeal, motion,

brief, or other paper.
The Court in Mauahan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) held that attorney's fees are appropriate in appeals
which are "obviously without merit, with no reasonable likelihood
of success, and which result in the delay of a proper judgment."
In Clark v. Booth, 821 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991) the Utah Supreme
Court recently ordered sanctions against a party and her attorneys
for a "bad faith" and "meritless motion" which had been filed.
In Taylor, supra, 770 P. 2d 163 (Utah 1989) the Court held sanctions
were appropriate for a meritless appeal.
In conclusion, both Petitioner and Attorney Stratford have not
made good faith arguments, but are simply trying to re-argue their
case by filing this motion. This practice is in violation of Rules
33 and 40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In the course of

defending this appeal, Respondents have incurred considerable costs
and now respectfully urge that sanctions and reasonable attorney's
fees be imposed.
Respondent

requests

the

court

consider

in

determining

reasonable attorney's fees those factors stated in the case of
Parents Against Drunk
Plaintiff

and

Drivers, Assignee of Robert J. Debrv,

Appellant,

v.

Gravstone

Pines

Homeowners'

Association, Counterclaimant and Respondent, v. et a h , 789 P.2d 52
(Utah 1990):
9

Factors which court should consider when
determining reasonable attorney fee are extent
of services provided, amount in controversy,
novelty
and
difficulty
of
issues
and
complexity of litigation, reasonableness of
number of hours expended to reach result in
case, experience and expertise of attorney,
fee customarily charged by other attorneys for
services performed, and how much of the work
actually performed was necessary to reach
result. (Id. p. 53)

POINT II
THE LAW IS CLEAR THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY IS NOT A BAR
TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS ON THE SAME SUBJECT
MATTER DUE TO DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF PROOF.
A.

Significant Cases on the Issues of Double Jeopardy.

The case of In re McCune, Utah, 717 P. 2d 701 (1986) is a major
case on the issue of double jeopardy in administrative proceedings.
In that case, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a claim that double
jeopardy

principles

have

an

application

in

Utah

State

Bar

disciplinary proceedings, the purpose of which "is to maintain the
honesty, integrity and professionalism of the Bar."

Id. at 707.

By clear and compelling analogy, double jeopardy principles
should also not apply in disciplinary licensure proceedings.

The

purpose of disciplinary proceedings is "to protect . . . citizens
from harmful and injurious acts by persons offering or providing
essential or necessary goods and services to the general public."
(See § 13-1-1 of Utah Annotate Code, 1953)
10

Acquittal of a petitioner on charges in a criminal prosecution
was held not to bar a subsequent finding in an administrative
parole revocation hearing in the case of Johns v. Shulesen, 717
P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986).

In this case the defendant had been

acquitted on criminal charges and the same charges were used to
revoke his parole.

The court concluded that the administrative

proceeding

from a clear violation

stemmed

of the rules and

regulations imposed as a condition of parole, and that a conviction
was not requisite to parole revocation.

Accordingly, evidence of

a successful criminal conviction of Mr. Barney is not required to
prove violation of licensing regulations.
The difference between administrative proceeding and criminal
proceedings was further demonstrated in the case of In Re Friedman,
457 A. 2d 983, 987 (1983).

In this case, a Pennsylvania physician

was the defendant in criminal and administrative proceedings
brought concerning allegedly immoral and unprofessional actions.
The doctor was acquitted on the criminal charges and sought to use
collateral estoppel to prevent the State Board of Medicine from
revoking his license. On appeal, the reviewing court rejected his
claims reasoning that there was no identity of issues rbetween
administrative and criminal matters] in view of the differing
standards of proof (emphasis added).
Moreover, in Lvness v. Com. State Bd. of Medicine, 561 A.2d
11

362, (PA Commonwealth 1989), the court also held that the physician
could be guilty of immoral and unprofessional conduct, and still be
not guilty of a criminal offense (emphasis added).

In Zanotto v.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dept. of Trans, 475 A. 2d 1375, double
jeopardy was held not to be an issue in a administrative proceeding
involving a drivers license matter.

The court stated:

Drivers suspension and revocation proceedings
are remedial sanctions which are civil in
nature, designed to protect the public from
unsafe drivers; as such, they cannot be
grounds for a double jeopardy challenge*.
B.

Differences in Burden of Proof.

Utah courts adhere to the general rule that "the comparative
degree of proof by which a case must be established is the same
before an administrative tribunal as in a judicial proceeding
that is, a preponderance of the evidence."

—

2 Am.Jur. 2d, § 392.

In Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d. 651 (Utah 1982), the Utah
Supreme

Court

held

that

in

an

administrative

preponderance of the evidence standard applied.
that:
license

action

the

The Court stated

"In contrast to prosecutions under criminal statutes, a
revocation

proceeding

requires

proof

only

by

a

preponderance of the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 652.

Similarly, in workers compensation cases, the Utah

Supreme Court has held that the preponderance of the evidences
standard applies.

See Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P. 2d
12

616 (Utah 1979).

See also Walker v. Board of Pardons, 803 P. 2d 124

(Utah 1990) in which the court stated, "the burden of proof in a
criminal proceeding is beyond a reasonable doubt . . . in an
administrative
evidence."

proceeding,

it

is by

a

preponderance

of

the

j[d. Therefore, double jeopardy does not apply in the

case herein,

(compare Rogers v. Div. of Real Estate, 790 P. 2d 102,

105 (Utah 1990)).

POINT III
THE DIVISION HAS NOT DEPARTED FROM USUAL AND ACCEPTED
PROCEDURE IN THIS CASE.
Mr. Barney alleges that the Division has not been concerned
with Petitioner's rights.

In truth, Petitioner has been afforded

all due process rights required by the rules and statute.
Petition, Mr. Barney derides the Division

In his

for balancing the

interests of Mr. Barney against the public interest (Brief at p.7).
In doing

so, he ignores

the Legislature's

establishing the Department of Commerce.

stated

intent in

Utah Code Ann. § 13-1-1

states as follows:
The Legislature finds that many businesses and
occupations in the state have a pronounced physical
and economic impact on the health, safety, and
welfare of the citizens of the state.
The
Legislature further finds that while the overall
impact is generally beneficial to the public, the
potential for harm and injury frequently warrants
intervention by state government.
13

The Legislature declares that it is appropriate and
necessary for state government to protect its
citizens from harmful and injurious acts by persons
offering or providing essential or necessary goods
and services to the general public.
The
Legislature
further
declares
that
business
regulation should not be unfairly discriminatory.
However, the general public interest must be
recognized and regarded as the primary purpose of
all regulation by state government (emphasis
added).
In Cannon v. Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207, 1210 (Utah 1980), the
Utah Supreme Court interpreted Title 58, Utah Code Ann., as
follows:
[I]t's general purpose is to provide for the
qualification, registration and licensing of
persons who hold themselves out to the public as
having qualifications in specialized areas which
affect the public health, safety or welfare and
thus to guard against unqualified persons deluding
others into believing that they are competent to
render such specialized services.
In balancing
interests,

the

the

public's

Division

interest

against

is performing

the

the

Petitioner's

legislatively

and

judicially mandated duty to the Division and is acting properly.

CONCLUSION
Respondent

respectfully

Certiorari be denied.

requests

Petitioner's

Writ

of

Respondent's further urges that this Court

award sanctions and reasonable attorney's fees against Petitioner
and his attorney for the filing of a frivolous appeal pursuant to
Rules 33 and 40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
14

!fa

DATED this (6

day of May, 1992.

'<w/

DELLA M. WELCH
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing

Respondent's

Reply

Brief

to

Petition

for Writ of

Certiorari was caused to be mailed, postage pre-paid on this [ &
day of May, 1992 to the following:
Dale E. Stratford
2404 Washington Blvd., #1218
Ogden, Utah 84401

,'

Delia M. Welch
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APPENDIX A

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water abdication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
sr VrTit of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
upreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
nder Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b,
itle 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial
Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme
Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, i 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sentence, which read Thereafter, the term of of-

ficeofajudgeofthe Court of Appeals is 6 years
and until a successor is appointed and approved under Section 20-1-7.1," into the
present third and fourth sentences and made
minor stylistic changes,

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction [Effective until January 1, 1992].
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
11
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review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

Court of Appeals jurisdiction [Effective January 1, 1992].
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, ft 46; 1987, ch. 161,ft 304; 19S8,
ch. 73, ft 1; 1988, ch. 210, ft 141; 1988, ch.
248, ft 8; 1990, ch. 80,ft 5; 1990, ch. 224, ft 3;
1991, ch. 268, ft 22.
Amended effective J a n u a r y 1, 1992. —

Laws 1991, ch 268, S 22 amends this section
effective January 1,1992 See amendment note
below.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment by ch 73, effective April 25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a) and (b) in
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58-1-2

58-1.1- Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing Act."
History: C. 1953, 58-1-1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 187, § 10.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1985,
ch 187, § 10 repealed former §§ 58-1-1 to
58-1-43 (L 1921, ch 130, §§ 1 to 7, 11, 12,
1923, ch 49, §§ 1, 2, Code Report, R S 1933 &
C 1943, 79-1-1 to 79-1-4, 79-1-6, 79-1-18 to
79-1-20, 79-1-22 to 79-1-39, L 1941 (1st S S ),
ch 28, § 1, 1943, ch 61, § 1, 1953, ch 96,
§ 1A, 1953, ch 97, § 1, 1957, ch 114, § 1,
1963, ch 113, § 1, 1963, ch 115, § 1, 1963, ch
116, §§ lto3,1967, ch 133, § l;1967,ch 134,

§§ lto3,1969, ch 165, § l,1973,ch 126, §§ 1
to 3, 1979, ch 11, § 1, 1979, ch 19, § 2, 1981,
ch 19, § l;1981,ch 34, §§ 1 to 4,1984, ch 67,
§ 29, 1984 (2nd S S ), ch 15, §§ 62, 63), general provisions relating to the division of registration, and enacted present §§58-1-1 to
58-1-20
Effective Dates. — Section 108 of Laws
1985, ch 187 provided 'This act Ukes effect
on July 1, 1985 "
Cross-References. — Divisions created in
Department of Commerce, § 13-1-2

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Lav,, 1986 Utah L Rev 95, 130

Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am Jur. 2d Licenses and
Permits § 1 et seq
C.J.S. — 53 C.J S Licenses § 2 et seq

58-1-2. Definitions.
For purposes of this title:
(1) "Department" means the Department of Commerce.
(2) "Director" means the director of the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing.
(3) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing.
(4) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Department of Commerce.
(5) "Licensee" includes any holder of a license, certificate, permit, student card, or apprentice card authorized under this title.
(6) "Unprofessional conduct" means acts, knowledge, and practices
which fail to conform writh the accepted standards of the specific licensed
occupation or profession and which could jeopardize the public health,
safety, or welfare and includes the violation of any statute regulating an
occupation or profession under this title.
History: C. 1953, 58-1-2, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 187, § 10; 1989, ch. 225, § 24.
Repeals and Reenactments. — See note
under same catchhne following § 58-1-1
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective March 14, 1989, substituted

"Department of Commerce" for "Department of
Business Regulation" in Subsections (1) and
(4)
Cross-References. — Department of Commerce, Chapter 1 of Title 13
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Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other
paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the
court shall grant a hearing.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Frivolous appeal.
—Defined.
—Sanctions.
Cited.
Frivolous appeal.
A husband's appeal from a judgment relating to alimony and distribution of marital
property was frivolous, where there was no basis for the argument presented and the evidence and law was mischaracterized and misstated. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah
1987).
Plaintiffs counsel violated rule and was
therefore subject to sanction when, after he investigated plaintiffs malpractice action

against defendant orthodontist and found that
he could not prove breach of duty or causation,
the record was devoid of any relevant, admissible evidence showing negligence, and after losing on summary judgment, he persisted in filing an appeal. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414
(Utah 1990).
An appeal brought from an action that was
properly determined to be in bad faith is necessarily frivolous under this rule. Utah Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).
—Defined.
For purposes of this rule, a "frivolous" appeal
is one having no reasonable legal or factual
basis. Lack of good faith is not required.
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A.L.R. — Abatement effects of accused's
death before appellate review of federal criminal conviction, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 446.

Rule 40

Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «= 329
et seq.

Rule 39. Duties of the clerk.
(a) General provisions. The office of the Clerk of the Court, with the clerk
or a deputy in attendance, shall be open during business hours on all days
except Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays.
(b) The docket; calendar; other records required. The clerk shall keep
a record, known as the docket, in form and style as may be prescribed by the
court, and shall enter therein each case. The number of each case shall be
noted on the page of the docket whereon the first entry is made. All papers
filed with the clerk and all process, orders and opinions shall be entered
chronologically in the docket on the pages assigned to the case. Entries shall
be brief but shall show the nature of each paper filed or decision or order
entered and the date thereof. The clerk shall keep a suitable index of cases
contained in the docket.
The clerk may keep a minute book, in which shall be entered a record of the
daily proceedings of the court. The clerk shall prepare, under the direction of
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or the Presiding Judge of the Court of
Appeals, a calendar of cases awaiting argument. In placing cases on the calendar for argument, the clerk shall give preference to appeals in accordance
with the priority of cases provided in Rule 29.
(c) Notice of orders. Immediately upon the entry of an order or decision,
the clerk shall serve a notice of entry by mail upon each party to the proceeding, together with a copy of any opinion respecting the order or decision.
Service on a party represented by counsel shall be made upon counsel.
(d) Custody of records and papers. The clerk shall have custody of the
records and papers of the court. The clerk shall not permit any original record
or paper to be removed from the court, except as authorized by these rules or
the orders or instructions of the court. Original papers transmitted as the
record on appeal or review shall upon disposition of the case be returned to the
court or agency from which they were received. The clerk shall preserve copies
of briefs and attachments, as well as other printed papers filed.

Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and
discipline.
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper
of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney
of record who is an active member in good standing of the Bar of this state.
The attorney shall sign his or her individual name and give his or her business address, telephone number, and Utah State Bar number. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign any motion, brief, or other paper
and state the party's address and telephone number. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers need
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the motion,
brief, or other paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or interposed for the
purpose of delay as defined in Rule 33. If a motion, brief, or other paper is not
479
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signed as required by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention of the attorney or party. If a
motion, brief, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the authority
and the procedures of the court provided by Rule 33 shall apply.
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may,
after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and
upon hearing, if requested, take appropriate action against any attorney or
person who practices before it for inadequate representation of a client, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a person allowed to appear before the
court, or for failure to comply with these rules or order of the court. Any action
to suspend or disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the
Ethics and Discipline Committee of the State Bar for proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Discipline of the State Bar.
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be construed to limit or impair the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers.
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to
practice before the bar of another state or a foreign country but who is not a
member of the Bar of this state, may appear, upon motion, pro hac vice. Such
attorney shall associate with an active member in good standing of the Bar of
this state and shall be subject to the provisions of this rule and all other rules
of appellate procedure.
Advisory Committee Note. — The rule is
amended to require that counsel provide the

court with counsel's Bar number and business
telephone number.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Govert Copier Painting v. Van
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Award of damages for dilatory tactics in prosecuting appeal in state court, 91
A.L.R.3d 661.
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding post-plea remedies, 13 A.L.R.4th 533.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding appellate and postconviction remedies, 15 A.L.R.4th 582.
Attorneys: revocation of state court pro hac
vice admission, 64 A.L.R.4th 1217.
Key Numbers. — Costs *» 252.

TITLE VI.
CERTIFICATION AND TRANSFER BETWEEN
COURTS.
Rule 41. Certification of questions of law by United States
courts.
(a) Authorization to answer questions of law. The Utah Supreme Court
may in its discretion answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of
the United States when requested to do so by such certifying court acting in
accordance with the provisions of this rule, but only if the state of the law of
Utah applicable to a proceeding before the certifying court is uncertain and
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Rule 47

TITLE VII.
JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO COURT OF APPEALS.
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of
Court of Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah.

Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by the Supreme Court.

Rule 47. Certification and transmission of record; filing;
parties.
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 48, pay the certiorari docketing
fee and file ten copies of a petition which shall comply in all respects with
Rule 49. The case then will be placed on the certiorari docket. Counsel for the
petitioner shall serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party
separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to
notify all parties in the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket
number of the case. Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21.
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases.
(c) Cross-petition of respondent. Counsel for a respondent wishing to file
a cross-petition shall, within the time provided by Rule 48(d), pay the certio485
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COMMERCE AND TRADE

13-1-1. Legislative findings and declarations.
The Legislature finds that many businesses and occupations in the state
have a pronounced physical and economic impact on the health, safety, and
welfare of the citizens of the state. The Legislature further finds that while
the overall impact is generally beneficial to the public, the potential for harm
and injury frequently warrants intervention by state government.
The Legislature declares that it is appropriate and necessary for state government to protect its citizens from harmful and injurious acts by persons
offering or providing essential or necessary goods and services to the general
public. The Legislature further declares that business regulation should not
be unfairly discriminatory. However, the general public interest mqst he rec^
ognized and regarded as the primary purpose ol all regulation by state government.
~
""
•
—
——**
History: C. 1953, 13-1-1, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 322, § 1.
Repeals and Enactments. — La*s 1963,
ch 322, § 1 repealed former § 13-1-1 (L 1941

(1st S S ), ch 5, § 1,C 1943,16A-1-1), relating
to creation of the department of business regulation, and enacted present § 13-1-1

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d — 15A Am Jur 2d Commerce
§§ 7 to 34
C.J.S. — 15 C.J S Commerce § 55
A.L.R. — Hearsa> evidence in proceedings

before state administrative agencies
A L R 3 d 12
Key Numbers. — Commerce •=> 48
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13-1-1.1 to 13-1-1.3. Repealed.
Repeals.— Sections 13-1-1 1 to 13-1-1 3 (L
1969, ch 34. §§ 1 to 3), relating to functions of
the department, the executive director and
continuation of the public service commission,

were repealed b\ La*s 1963, ch 322, § 13
Sections 13-1-1.1 and 13-1-13 were also repealed b> Laws 1983 ch 246, § 24

13-1-2. Creation and functions of department — Divisions
created — Fees.
(1) There is created the Department of Business Regulation, hereafter referred to as the department. The department shall execute and administer
state laws regulating business activities and occupations affecting the public
interest.
(2) There is created within the department the following divisions.
(a) the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing,
(b) the Division of Real Estate;
(c) the Division of Securities;
(d) the Division of Contractors;
(e) the Division of Public Utilities;
(f) the Division of Consumer Protection; and
(g) the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code.
(3) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the department may adopt a
schedule of fees assessed for services provided by the department The fee
shall be reasonable and fair, and shall reflect the cost of services provided
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STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted "except
that final agency action from informal adjudicative proceedings based on a record shall be
reviewed by the district courts on the record

according to the standards of Subsection
63-46b-16(4)" at the end in Subsection (l)(a)
and made minor stylistic changes
Effective Dates. — Laws L987, ch 161,
§ 315 m a k e s the act effective on January 1,
1933

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court.
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals Therefore,

the district court will no longer function as mtermediate appellate court except to review informal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section In re
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct App 1988)

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
73,6

